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ABSTRACT. Recently businesses need to find the new ways to ensure business growth and 
competitiveness in the international market. Cultural diversity of international business brings new 
challenges in the development and implementation of negotiation strategies of businesses, in 
cooperation with foreign partners. At present business solutions are used for development and 
implementation of negotiating strategies for international business, which are not universally 
suitable for business development in all situations in context of globalization, with current 
challenges, which are characterized by increasing risk, uncertainty and cultural differences. New 
challenges in international business negotiations are caused by formation of common cultural and 
information space in a global scale, the new demands for information technology progress in 
development of international competition and accelerating innovation processes. International 
business negotiation strategy development and implementation are setting the essential features and 
causal relations and is relevant in practice by creating in each negotiation case the unique 
negotiation strategy, focused on maximizing the effectiveness of the international business with the 
aim of more efficient use of business negotiation potential – the negotiating power. In scientific 
problem solving it is necessary to offer such instruments, which would take into account bargaining 
power of participants in negotiations, and would allow real implementation of business strategies 
and constitute an appropriate contribution to their development. The article aims - to design a 
theoretical model for preparing and implementing strategies of international business negotiations, 
based on evaluations of bargaining powers and to verify experimentally its relevance and 
applicability. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The modern business world faces with a huge multicultural diversity and its inherent specificity, 
requiring adequate theoretical solutions in the organization and management of international 
business. International business development under conditions of globalization determines that 
representatives of many different cultures are participating in different   negotiations. This leads to 
additional difficulties in modeling the negotiating strategic decisions and ensuring their support. 
Therefore, there is an obvious need to develop adequate models of real bargaining situations, 
assessing the potential of the negotiating parties - their bargaining power. In this article is checked 
authors created model, which is designed to help in developing strategies of international business 
negotiations, based on the assessment of bargaining power.  This model will be tested in a typical 
area of international business negotiations - in wholesale trade. The model is based on the game 
theory methods in order to find the optimal strategy of negotiations, to customize the optimization 
rules for international trade negotiations under uncertainty. The created model is designed for the 
development and implementation of strategies based on the assessment of bargaining power, for the 
analysis of the strategic actions in the negotiations and strategic decision-making. The complexity 
and systematic of negotiating issues determines the need to take into account the abundance of 
criteria for assessing the situations, processes and negotiating potential. For this purpose we use 
multi-criteria analysis by using experts. The results indicate that created model can be used to 
International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences Online: 2015-12-18
ISSN: 2300-2697, Vol. 65, pp 1-15
doi:10.18052/www.scipress.com/ILSHS.65.1
© 2015 SciPress Ltd., Switzerland
SciPress applies the CC-BY 4.0 license to works we publish: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
support international business and e-business negotiations as an independent systematic element of 
negotiating process (standalone or in part, requiring intervention by the negotiator).  
Problem. There are no theoretical solutions in theory of management, as well as in business 
management for the assessment of bargaining power in international business negotiations, with 
regard to particularly relevant options to use in the negotiating process their support technologies. 
Research object. To support drafting of international business negotiation strategies based on 
bargaining power evaluations. 
The research aim. To present a theoretical model for the development and implementation of 
strategies in international business negotiations, based on the assessment of bargaining power, and 
verify experimentally its adequacy and applicability in the wholesale trade. 
Research methods - comparative, logical analysis and synthesis of scientific literature, 
comparison and generalization methods, mathematical and statistical methods of data analysis. 
2. Model for Developing Strategy of International Business Negotiations Based on Evaluations 
of the Bargaining Power  
In our opinion the development and implementation of negotiation strategies must rely on 
evaluation of bargaining power. As knowledge of negotiation situations may take place during the 
negotiating process the strategy and tactics of actions (steps) can vary with each new issue. The 
analysis of scientific literature (Ginevičius et al. 2013; Ginevičius 2008; Tamošiūnas 2011; 
Zavadskas et al. 2015; Zavadskas 2004) shows that the application of heuristic algorithms in 
creation model for  development and implementation the negotiating strategy in order to assess the 
bargaining power and to reflect better the progress of negotiations is promising. We define the 
condition that each negotiating issue will be considered only once, without returning to it. The 
heuristic algorithm will seek to find wins strategies, generating the greatest aggregate benefits in 
negotiations. For this purpose will be used optimization rules, proposed by various scientists 
(Hurwitz, Wald, Savage and Niehaus, Bernoulli-Laplace, Bayes-Laplace, Hodges and Lehmann). 
We provide rankings of negotiation issues so that matters will go from the most important to least 
important, in order to ensure that the further course of negotiations would not be in vain. For 
example, finding out in the final stage of negotiations, that the other side can’t meet the basic 
criteria (the negotiating team has not the person empowered to sign the agreement or contract), it 
turns out that all the costs of the negotiations have been made in vain.  
This optimization task is quite complicated because of the single most useful wins of the 
previous negotiation issues do not necessarily will provide the most useful amount of total winnings 
of all the negotiating issues, which implies that you must look for the best value of total wins in 
negotiations - to solve the task of global optimization. For example: in negotiations are settled three 
issues in each of them solution is selected from available alternatives. Although the wins from the 
first two questions were not the most useful but their choice has led to wins from the best third 
questions alternative, which brings the maximum possible benefit of the whole negotiation process.  
After defining the priority list of negotiating issues, we must emphasize that on each issue is 
negotiating with a set of potential negotiating partners. Assume that negotiator has a finite set of 
alternatives and each issue consists of t alternatives. Let us denote alternatives bi,j, j =1, 2, 3, … , ti for the i-th question. Then the i-th question of all alternatives set of values is 
denoted wi = {bi,1, bi,2, … , bi,ti, and w1 × w2 × w3 … wn is the set of all possible negotiation 
scenarios when for every issue is selected one from the available alternatives, n is the number of 
negotiating issues.  
Noted b0 as start of negotiations, the whole negotiation process can be shown in a graphic-tree 
(Fig. 1), where the arcs Hi,bijdenotes winnings after we have chosen the j-th alternative to resolving 
the the i-th issue. maxk∈w1×w2×w3…wn �∑ Hi,bi,jni=1 � , j = 1, … , |wi|,                (1) 
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there: 
H - the negotiators issue as winnings according to the chosen optimization rule (Hurwitz, Wald, 
Werner etc.); 
n - the number of negotiating issues (peaks mark the start and end of negotiations). 
The peak b0 marks the start of negotiations, peaks bij notes the j-th alternative of i-th question, 
and the arcs Hi,bij  indicates winnings, which we could have by selecting j-th alternative in solving 
the i-th issue j ∈ w1 × w2 × w3 … wn. 
Further, as an example, we shall provide Hurwitz formula, which will be used in order to find the 
best issue winnings for negotiations at the uncertainties: Hu = maxu[γminz auz + (1 − γ) maxz auz] (the best maximal decision);                      (2) 
    Hu = minu[γmaxz auz + (1 − γ) minz auz] (the best minimal decision).                       (3) 
Where: 
H – negotiator winnings on negotiating issue by Hurwitz rule. auz −  negotiator winnings, which he is able to get if he will do the move u in case if opponent will 
make a move z.  
Negotiators set of moves is finite and consist of the moves which will be numbered: u = 1, 2, 
3,...,s. 
We accept the assumption that opponent's set of possible moves is finite and consists of k moves 
which are numbered:  z = 1, 2, 3, ..., k. 
γ - hope parameter; γ - a factor that varies from 0 to 1. In the formula we can see that if γ = 1 so 
Hurvico criteria coincide with Waldo, this is with the pessimistic criterion. 
If γ = 0, we obtain an optimistic solution, one that allows you to get the maximum winnings. 
What size coefficient to choose depends on the type of decision - optimistic or pessimistic - 
negotiator chooses. Perhaps it is the most acceptable factor  γ = 0.5, because this is a situation where 
the average solution is selected between pessimistic and optimistic. This gambling can be written by 
the so-called winnings matrix array and is called gambling. Zero-sum games form: 
Γ = {S1, S2;  A}.              (4) 
Applying it to the negotiating challenges it can be suggested that the first negotiators set of 
strategies (pure strategies) is S1 = {S11, S12, … , S1s}, and set of pure strategies of second negotiator 
is S2 = {S21, S22, … , S2k}. S1 ir S2. They are finite and known. Function of winnings is A =
‖auz‖sxk. Negotiators moves set is complete, it consists of s moves, which are numbered as u = 1, 
2, 3, ..., s. We accept the assumption that opponent's possible set of moves is finite and consists of k 
moves z = 1, 2, 3, ..., k.  
Gambling matrix is used to find the most advantageous strategy for negotiating issue. Every play 
has a finite solution in pure or mixed strategies and the net value of solution complies with the 
inequality: α ≤ ν ≤ β. 
If α = β = v, then solution with clear strategies is a saddle point (only one optimal strategy for 
each player). 
The number α is called the lowest slot value, β - largest gambling value, v is called the net value 
of gaming or gambling price. 
By using game theory methods for specific tasks it is needed efficiency indicators of a pure value 
which must express relationship with optimum value and must be independent from matrix. 
We shall use simple additive weighting method (SAW) of exponential expression using different 
degree of measure criteria values in cases of the best minimal and the best maximum values, when 
normalized values are limited in the range [0, 1]: 
     𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 =  �min𝑢𝑢 𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 �3, if min𝑢𝑢 𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢  advantageous,                                 (5) 
𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 =  � 𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢max𝑢𝑢 𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢�2, if max𝑢𝑢 𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢  advantageous.                                              (6) 
The latter formula we will use for the normalization of negotiations indicators in order to 
facilitate the processing of the outcome of negotiations and to obtain comparative values. 
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Keeping the initial data about the importance of indicators on negotiating issues, it is necessary 
to determine the significance of parameters characterizing the negotiating issues (Ginevičius et al. 
2014; Ginevičius et al. 2008; Berth et al. 2000; Mandow Cruz 2003; Wibowo, Deng 2013; Azar 
2014). Indicators significance will show how many times the usefulness rate of one or another 
negotiating issue is higher (lower) than another indicator’s usefulness. Knowing significance of the 
negotiations issue parameters there  can be determined each of their values in such a way 
(Ginevičius, Podvezko 2008a; Ginevičius, Podvezko 2008b; Ginevičius et al. 2008; Stewart et al. 
2013; Ehtamo et al. 2001; Martin Ramos et al. 2010; Lourenzutti, Krohling 2014; Chang, Wu 2011; 
Azar 2014; Keršulienė 2008): 
1. Elected the most significant indicator of negotiations issue - ager; 
2. For the best value of analysed issue is given 1 point value of significance ( ager= 1); 
3. It is determined by how many percent (q v) the values of remaining indicators (bv) are worse 
than the best (ager= 1); 
4. It is determined by how many percent (q v) the values of remaining indicators (bv) are worse 
than the best (ager= 1); 
 
Fig. 1. Graph of negotiations (composed by the author) 
5. It is determined by how many percent (q v) the values of remaining indicators (bv)  are 
worse than the best (ager= 1); 
6. For indicators values are granted the relative values (av = 1 − qv/100); 
7. The relative values of all indicators (qv) are converted in such a way that their sum would 
be equal to one: 
∑ qv = 1; v = 1,2,mv=1 …, m. 
We use multiple criteria evaluation in case of using game theory methods when the issue of 
negotiations deals with more than one indicator. This estimation of few normalized indicators will 
be used in gaming matrix in order to find the winning of negotiations issue.  
The negotiation process can be shown in the graph (Figure 1).  
The peak b0 marks the start of negotiations, peaks bij  marks the j-th alternative of the i-th issue, 
and the graph arc Hi,bijindicates winning which we have after choosing the j-th alternative in 
solving the i-th issue. Below is given a global optimization task for a fixed number of negotiating 
issues, which are foreseen in negotiating agenda before negotiations. 
Table 1 presents theoretical model of international business negotiation strategy based on 
estimation the bargaining power. In the model are made ratings of bargaining power for three 
subjects: the negotiations participant, his opponent, the competitor of negotiations participant. The 
bargaining power of these subjects is assessed according to their importance in the negotiations 
participant’s strategy, which is based on the bargaining power estimation. These entities directly 
influence decision-making in preparing negotiating strategy. 
In the model evaluation of bargaining power of all subjects of negotiations and preparing 
strategy of negotiations are carried out in this order: first is carried out non-linear normalization of 
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the indicators of negotiation issues; multi-criteria evaluation of negotiations issues indicators; 
gaming matrix is used to find the most advantageous negotiating strategies on the issue; optimality 
rules are used to find the maximum win of the negotiations issues; optimization task is solved to 
find the maximum win for the negotiations; finally, the comparison of assessed bargaining powers 
is carried out and decision-making. 
Created model for negotiating strategy development will be used for preparing international 
business negotiation strategies based on the bargaining power assessment. This negotiating strategy 
development model later will be used in solving complex issues and problems of negotiations. We 
will investigate whether model designed is effective for support of international business 
negotiations in case of wholesale. 
3. The Methodology of the Empirical Study Designed to Test Strategy Development Model 
Based on the Assessment of Bargaining Power in International Business Negotiations  
In this paper, empirical studies attempts to analyze negotiating strategy based on the assessment 
of bargaining power in a typical field of international business negotiation - in the case of wholesale 
trade. In order properly adjust and check the created model of business negotiation strategy based 
on evaluations of bargaining power in international negotiations. This study is necessary, because it 
can show the potential applicability of the model and check its basic settings. In the empirical study 
are used the following research methods: logical analysis, logical generation. comparison of 
findings and generalization techniques; mathematical and statistical methods of data analysis used 
in processing and analyzing empirical data obtained through studies of statistical analysis performed 
using SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) software. Game theory methods (Xu et al. 
2012; Pena et al. 2014; Cevikel et al. 2010; Panda et al. 2014; Zavadskas et al., 2004; Apynis 
March 2007; Žilinskas 2007) and multiple criteria evaluation are used to carry out an assessment of 
business entities bargaining power in international business negotiations, in order to choose 
effective strategic decisions in international business negotiations. This is done using MathLab 
software. 
The study raised the following hypothesis: 
H1: International business negotiation practice. There is a lack of dispositions and possibilities 
for a reasonable and adequate assessment of various business entities negotiating power, according 
to one of the circumstances of multiculturalism occurring in modern conditions of business 
internationalization and to the distance negotiating technology and e-business development 
opportunities. 
H2: international business negotiation strategies based on the assessment of bargaining power 
give effective results in negotiations compared to the negotiations, which are not based on the 
assessment of bargaining power. 
The first (H1) and second (H2) hypotheses will attempt to prove with the help of analysis of 
preparing negotiating strategy based on the assessment of bargaining power in a typical field of 
international business negotiation - in the case of wholesale trade. Empirical research is oriented 
towards search of the basic parameters of model and justification of its application. 
Following is given a diagram of empirical studies (Fig. 2). 
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Table 1. International business negotiation strategy and the preparation of the theoretical 
model based on bargaining power estimation (composed by the author) 
 Subjects interested in 
negotiations 
Negotiations participant Negotiations opponent Competitor of negotiations 
participant 
No. The order of application of the 
algorithm formulas 
Mathematical expressions of steps of the algorithm 
1. Is performed nonlinear Peldschus 
normalization of negotiations 
issue indicators. 
                                        𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 =  �min𝑢𝑢 𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 �3 𝑖𝑖f min𝑢𝑢 𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢      𝑢𝑢  𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓,                     𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 =  � 𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢max𝑢𝑢 𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢�2 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 max𝑢𝑢 𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢  𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓. 
2. 
Multiple criteria evaluation on 
negotiation issues indicators. 
1. Election of  the most significant indicator of negotiations issue - ager; 
2. For the best value of analysed issue is given 1 point value of significance ( ager= 1); 
3. It is determined by how many percent (q v) the values of remaining indicators (bv)  are 
worse than the best (ager= 1); 
4. For indicators values are granted the relative values (av = 1 − qv/100); 
5. The relative values  of all indicators 
(qv) are converted in such a way that their sum is equal to one: 
a. ∑ qv = 1; v = 1,2,mv=1 …, m. 
3. 
Gaming matrix is solved in order 
to find the most advantageous 
strategy for negotiating issue. 
The form of zero-sum games: 
𝛤𝛤 = {𝑆𝑆1, 𝑆𝑆2;  𝐴𝐴}. 
Applying it to solve the negotiating issues you may suspect that a set of the first negotiators strategies 
(pure strategies) is 𝑆𝑆1 = {𝑆𝑆11, 𝑆𝑆12, … , 𝑆𝑆1𝑠𝑠}, and a set of the second negotiators pure strategies is 
𝑆𝑆2 = {𝑆𝑆21,𝑆𝑆22, … , 𝑆𝑆2𝑘𝑘}. 𝑆𝑆1 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑆2 are finite and known. Function of winnings is  𝐴𝐴 = ‖𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢‖𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘 
A set of negotiators moves is finite and consists of s moves, which will be numbered u =1, 2, 3, 
…, s. 
We accept the assumption that your opponent's set of possible moves is finite, which consists of  k  
moves. These moves shall be numbered z=1, 2, 3, …, k. Every finite gambling has a solution in pure or mixed strategies and the net value reflects the  
𝛼𝛼 ≤ 𝜈𝜈 ≤ 𝛽𝛽. 
If α = β = v, then solution with clear strategies is a saddle point (only one optimal strategy for each 
player). 
The number α is called the lowest slot value, β - largest gambling value, v is called the net value of 
gaming or gambling price.  
4. 
The optimality rules are usedin 
order to find the maximum win of 
the negotiations issue (as the 
example is provided Hurwitz 
rule). 
𝐻𝐻𝑢𝑢 = max𝑢𝑢[𝛾𝛾min𝑢𝑢 𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 + (1 − 𝛾𝛾) max𝑢𝑢 𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢] (The best maximal decision); 
𝐻𝐻𝑢𝑢 = min𝑢𝑢[𝛾𝛾max𝑢𝑢 𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 + (1 − 𝛾𝛾) min𝑢𝑢 𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢] (The best minimal decision); 
Where: 
H – the participants winning of negotiation issue according Hurwitz rule, 
𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 − the winning , which participant could get if he will make the move uin case if his 
opponent  will make the move z.  
Negotiators moves alternatives set is complete and consists of s moves, which will be numbered u = 1, 
2, 3, ..., s. 
We accept the assumption that opponent's possible set of moves is finite and consists of k moves z = 1, 
2, 3, ..., k.  
γ – the hope parameter, γ - a factor that varies from 0 to 1. 
5. 
Optimization task is solved in 
order to find the maximum 
winnings of negotiations 
max
𝑘𝑘∈𝑤𝑤1×𝑤𝑤2×𝑤𝑤3…𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 ��𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
� , 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , |𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖|, 
Where: 
H – the participants winning of negotiation issue according Hurwitz rule, 
n – amount of negotiating issues (the peaks note the start and the end of negotiating issue). Noted b0  as the start of negotiations, the whole process of negotiations can be presented as 
graph-tree (Fig. 1), where graph arc H i,bijindicates the winnings, which can be achieved by selecting j-
th alternative in solving the i-th issue  k ∈ w1 × w2 × w3 … wn. 
After defining the priotity list of negotiation issues, let us note, that on each negotiating issue there 
negotiations with a set of potential partners of negotiations. Let us assume that set of negotiator’s 
alternatives is finite and each issue consists from t alternatives. Alternatives of i-th issue will be noted 
as 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗, 𝑗𝑗 = 1, 2, 3, … , 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖. Then i-th issue set of all alternatives we shall note as 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 = {𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,1,𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,2, … , 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖}, o 𝑤𝑤1 × 𝑤𝑤2 × 𝑤𝑤3 …𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 which is set of all possible nagatiations scenario, 
when on each issue is selected one from possible alternatives, n is amount of negotiations issues. 
6. Comparison of bargaining powers 
and decision making 
Strategy of international business negotiations based on estimation of bargaining powers. 
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Fig. 2. Empirical Research Scheme (composed by the author) 
The case of wholesale trade is the most common in international business negotiations. The 
research is carried out taking into account the specifics of this sphere. After checking the suitability 
of this model in typical case there could be considered further studies about its applicability in other 
areas. In this study, are used game theory methods, heuristic algorithm (Berth et al. 2000; Mandow 
Cruz 2003; Wibowo, Deng 2013; Azar 2014; Tamošiūnas 2011), multi-criteria evaluation. 
For multi-criteria assessment of negotiations are invited the experts from the spheres of relevant 
negotiating concrete cases. There are analyzed subjects involved in the negotiations and their 
negotiating objects, who are representing a typical international business negotiation case. Specific 
details on the subjects and objects of negotiations are confidential in order not to disclose their trade 
secrets, so presentation of research data is limited. However, the presented data enable to reflect 
investigation process and its results. 
For empirical verification of the model it is appropriate to rely on game theory methods, because 
it allows to analyze the interaction of objects having their own goals. This is particularly important 
in international business negotiations where representatives of different cultures are meeting, and 
this creates a lot of uncertainties. In order to develop the international business negotiation strategy 
based on the assessment of bargaining power, it is appropriate to use game theory methods that help 
to create a model for preparation of effective strategies. Game theory is described as a set of 
methods for handling conflict situations. Its purpose is to prepare recommendations in accepting 
rational solutions for the participants of conflict (Bivainis, 2011). To use of game theory methods 
always is available when it is possible to foresee options of negotiators activities, analyzing one 
version of each negotiating party (the player) (Keršulienė, 2008). Of course, game theory can’t fully 
define the decisions in all cases of negotiations but practice has proven that game theory methods 
are the perfect tool helping to make reasonable and appropriate strategic decisions. In many 
situations of business negotiations negotiators often must make decisions under uncertainty. Of 
Comparison of assessed bargaining powers and decision-
making. 
Negotiating strategy of  international business based on the 
assessment of bargaining power 
Estimation of bargaining powers on negotiations subjects 
 
1) Carried out non-linear normalization of the indicators of negotiation issues;  
2) Multi-criteria evaluation of negotiations issues indicators; 
3) Solving of gaming matrix in order to find the most advantageous negotiating 
strategies on the issue;  
4) Optimality rules are used to find the maximum win of the negotiations issues; 
5) Optimization task is solved to find the maximum win of negotiations 
Subjects interested in negotiations 
Oponent of 
negotiations 
Participant of 
negotiation 
Competitor of participant 
of negotiations 
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 course, in the assessment of bargaining power we tried to reduce this information deficit, but this 
was not possible to achieve fully due to the large number of variables. Therefore, there are invoked 
various rules for calculating the optimal strategies. 
4. Characteristic of Typical Case for Strategy Development Based on the Assessment of 
Bargaining Power in International Business Negotiations  
We will continue to study characteristic of a typical case for strategy development based on the 
assessment of bargaining power in international business negotiations – wholesale trade case. We 
will review the importance of this activity in the EU and Lithuania. The analysis has been prepared 
on the basis of data from Eurostat (in 2015), the Ministry of Economy of Lithuania (in 2015) 
Department of Statistics of Lithuania (in 2015 and in 2014) and the Bank of Lithuania (in 2015). 
Wholesale trade. According to the Lithuanian Department of Statistics (2015) in 2014 year 
Lithuanian exports of goods amounted to 24.4 billion EUR, import - 26.5 billion EUR. Lithuania 
mainly exported to Russia, Latvia, Poland and Germany. Mostly goods of Lithuanian origin were 
exported to the EU (almost 70 per cent of the total exports). The main partners of Lithuanian 
exports were Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands and Poland (Lithuanian Department of Statistics, 
2015). Most of the goods were imported to Lithuania from Russia, Germany, Poland and Latvia. 
Goods imported from the EU countries increased by 7.2 percent in value and amounted 63.8 percent 
from the total Lithuanian import. Russian imports decreased by 14.8 percent and amounted 27.6 
percent of the total import of Lithuania (Lithuanian Department of Statistics, 2015). Due to 
unfavorable geopolitical changes, a decline in export prices, the devalued currencies of Russia and 
other Commonwealth of Independent States not only in Lithuania, but also in the European Union 
(EU (28)) declined exports of goods, which Lithuania traders are re-exporting and due their 
competitive opportunities. Slow growth of exports of goods and services can be partially linked to 
the geopolitical situation in the eastern part of Europe and the slowly recovering demand in Western 
markets. The sustained tension between Russia and Ukraine, it seems, has worsened and the overall 
investment climate for companies particularly related to Eastern European markets. In the last 
quarter of 2014 year export was inhibited by some factors (Lithuanian Ministry of Economy, 2015): 
complicated geopolitical situation in the region (the Russian embargo of the EU food industry and 
agricultural production, as well as other Russian-Ukrainian conflict escalation aspects), falling 
export prices for products and quite slope Western markets demand (Lithuanian Ministry of 
Economy, 2015). Re-exports during 2014 year fourth quarter grew by 4.6 percent (throughout 2014 
- 8.7 percent). Despite trade restrictions and the worsening economic situation in Russia and on the 
markets belonging to the Lithuanian trade, logistics and transport company found enough business 
opportunities for East-West (EU-Russia) supply chain (Lithuanian Ministry of Economy, 2015). As 
we can see, the latter activities in EU and Lithuania are significant. Therefore, in further research 
will be carried out of strategy development based on the assessment of bargaining power in 
international business negotiations in wholesale trade. 
5. Wholesale Strategy Development Based on the Assessment of Bargaining Power in 
International Business Negotiations  
This study will examine model of strategy development based on the assessment of bargaining 
power in international business negotiations - case of the wholesale trade. 
It will allow to check out the adequacy of created negotiating strategy development model for 
business negotiation support based on the assessment of bargaining power,  there will be carried out 
assessment of bargaining power through negotiation stakeholders, according which will be prepared 
strategy. The study will include 4 international business entities. Next are described the participants 
and the context of negotiations.  
Situation and its context. Retail chain renovates its stores in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. He is 
looking for a supplier of external cladding panels. The supply agreement would be concluded for a 
fixed period and substances. Lithuania has already renovated a number of shops with these matters. 
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 Suppliers must have their own warehouses in Eastern Europe according the request, the plates 
should be delivered within a few days. 
Business entities who are interested in negotiations: 
Participant No. 1 – competitor for negotiation participants No. 3 and No. 4. This business entity 
is the supplier of facade panels with extensive operating experience. This participant sells other 
construction materials for negotiating opponent (the participant No. 2). However, until now he has 
not sold facade panels for negotiating opponent because the latter buy facade panels from the 
participant No. 3. 
Participant No. 2 - the contracting business entity - negotiating opponent. This is a retail chain 
that searches good quality, but cheap facade decoration. This negotiation opponent is looking for 
companies which can supply materials reliably without interruptions. 
Participant No. 3 - entity who gets negotiation support. This participant supplies facade panels 
for 5 years. Participant No. 2 carried out many construction projects from the supplied materials, so 
switching can cause inconvenience, as there may be different shades of boards and other 
parameters. 
Participant No. 4 - is a competitor for negotiations participants No.1 and No. 3. This competitor 
supplies facade panels from Asia. However, this business entity had several cases where products 
had quality problems and did not meet the standards. That was publicized in press and held pre-trial 
investigations. 
The winnings of negotiations will be assessed in relation to the business entity which purchases 
products. The negotiating with other business entities will take part in these international 
negotiations (1 formula). The criteria by which proposals will be evaluated in accordance to other 
business entities: duration (months), price (in euros), the probability of delays to pay (per cent). The 
results of probability on delivery time, price and delay to pay will be minimized (5 formula). For 
the evaluation importance of negotiating issue criteria are invoked experts from negotiating team 
(10 wholesale trade sector experts - project managers, managers, brokers and clients). Concordance 
rate is calculated to determine the compatibility of the expert opinions (16-19 formula). Then is 
given a normalized decision matrix (5-6 formula) in Wald, Savage and Niehaus, Bernoulli-Laplace, 
Bayes-Laplace, Hodges and Lehmann. Accordingly, under the applicable rules of optimization there 
were adopted the same source data for all rules: the hope factor of 0.5; and the probability of the 
event 0.25. Each entity provides 4 offers of alternatives. However, the accuracy of the negotiating 
results is determined by the possible uncertainty of information. Therefore, to reduce this negative 
impact on the lack of information, in order to reduce uncertainties there have been used credit 
information on business entities. In Annex 1 are presented evaluation data of initial negotiation 
proposals. There are selected the optimality criteria and consequently are chosen the best rates. The 
experts from negotiating team are employed to assess the relevance of negotiations issues criterion. 
Next there are given results of the expert’s assessment on indicators significance (Tables 2 and 
3).accordance with the relevant criteria and calculated the total value of alternatives.  
Table 2. The matrix of the expert’s evaluation 
Estimation of criteria weight by negotiation expert group 
 Criteria  Experts 1 2 3 Sum 
1 0,6 0,3 0,1 1 
2 0,5 0,2 0,3 1 
3 0,6 0,3 0,1 1 
4 0,6 0,3 0,1 1 
5 0,6 0,3 0,1 1 
6 0,5 0,3 0,2 1 
7 0,7 0,2 0,1 1 
8 0,7 0,2 0,1 1 
9 0,6 0,3 0,1 1 
10 0,6 0,3 0,1 1 
Sum 6 2,7 1,3 10 
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 Table 3. The matrix of the expert’s evaluation ranking   
Matrix of the experts evaluation ranking 
 Criteria  Experts 1 2 3 Sum 
1 1 2 3 6 
2 1 3 2 6 
3 1 2 3 6 
4 1 2 3 6 
5 1 2 3 6 
6 1 2 3 6 
7 1 2 3 6 
8 1 2 3 6 
9 1 2 3 6 
10 1 2 3 6 
Sum 10 21 29 60 
Ranking sum 
average 20 20 20  
Deviation 100 1 81 182 
Concordation 
coefficient W 0,91  
 
In another step we shall compare gaming performance by applying different rules of 
optimization (4 and 7-15 formula). There was a choice of following rules (7-15 formula): Hurwitz, 
Wald, Savage and Niehaus, Bernoulli-Laplace, Bayes-Laplace, Hodges and Lehmann. Accordingly, 
under the applicable rules of optimization there were adopted the same source data for all rules: the 
hope factor of 0.5; and the probability of the event 0.25. Each entity provides 4 offers of 
alternatives. However, the accuracy of the negotiating results is determined by the possible 
uncertainty of information. Therefore, to reduce this negative impact on the lack of information, in 
order to reduce uncertainties there have been used credit information on business entities. In Annex 
1 are presented evaluation data of initial negotiation proposals. There are selected the optimality 
criteria and consequently are chosen the best rates. The experts from negotiating team are employed 
to assess the relevance of negotiations issues criterion. Further are given rules of optimization:  
 
Wald rule S1∗ = {S1i| S1i ∈ S1 ∩ �S1i0ai0j0maxi minj aij��,                                                                                       (7) 
Hurwicz rule Aj = maxi((1 − λ) minj aij + λmaxj aij),              (8) Aj = mini((1 − λ) maxj aij + λminj aij),               (9) S1∗ = {S1i| S1i ∈ Si ∩ {S1i0 | hi0 = maxi hi ; hi = maxi(1 − λ) minj aij + λmaxj aij ;  0 ≤ λ ≤ 1��. (10) 
Savage and Niehaus rule S1∗ = {S1i| S1i ∈ S1 ∩ {S1i0 | ri0j0 =  mini maxj rij��.           (11) 
here r = 1m����; s = 1, n�����. 
Bernoulli-Laplace rule S1∗ = {S1i/S1i ∈ S1 ∩ maxi�1/n∑ aijni=1 ��.             (12) 
Bayes-Laplace rule S1∗ = {S1i/S1i ∈  Si ∩ maxi�∑ qjnj=1 aij� ∩ ∑ qj = 1nj=1 �.                             (13) 
Hodges-Lehmann rule S1∗ = �S1iS1i ∈ Si ∩  maxi�λ∑ qjaij = (1 − λ) minj aijnj=1 �
∩ 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 �.             (14) 
Werner rule 
𝑆𝑆1
∗ = �𝑆𝑆1𝑖𝑖| 𝑆𝑆1𝑖𝑖 ∈  𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ∩  �𝑆𝑆1𝑖𝑖0|𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖0 = max𝑖𝑖∈𝑀𝑀𝜀𝜀 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ;𝑀𝑀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 = �𝑖𝑖| max𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 min𝑗𝑗 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝜀𝜀�;  max𝑗𝑗 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ≥ max𝑗𝑗 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖0𝑗𝑗�.  (15) 
𝜀𝜀 − the extent of the risk. 
 
Concordance coefficient 
 
Concordance coefficient W is calculated by the following formula (Ginevičius et al., 2008; 
Sėrikovienė, 2013; Maskeliūnaitė, 2012): 
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 W = 12S
r2m(m2−1).                    (16) 
Here r - the number of experts, m - the evaluates the indicators number. 
The value S is calculated as follows: 
Calculating assessments made by experts eik each indicator rank-sum ei by the following 
formula (Ginevičius et al., 2008; Sėrikovienė, 2013; Maskeliūnaitė, 2012): ei = ∑ eikrk=1 ,                  (17) 
The total number of grades on average e� by the following formula (Ginevičius et al., 2008): e� =  ∑ eimi=1
m
,                    (18) 
Value S, t.y. rank-sum ei deviations from the general average e� the sum of the squares counted 
by the following formula (Ginevičius et al., 2008): S = ∑ (ei − e�)2mi=1 ,                   (19) 
 
In the next step is presented normalized decision matrix (5-6 formula), in which are adjusted 
criteria for significance. In 4 - 6 tables are provided gaming matrix normalized according 
importance of the criteria (Formula 4). Figure 3 compares the results of gaming observed with 
various optimization rules. The diagram (Fig. 3) provides summary of the results of winnings on the 
negotiation support (2.8 - 16.2 and 1 formulas), according to optimization rules. There is displayed 
information which negotiators proposal was with the biggest winnings according to different 
optimization rules, as well as the cumulative winnings for all issues. In Figure 3 are given support 
of winnings of wholesale trade business negotiations in each question under different optimization 
rules: Hurwitz, Wald, Savage and Niehaus, Bernoulli-Laplace, Bayes-Laplace, Hodges and 
Lehmann. Optimization rules enable us to simulate various situations in the negotiations, to see the 
maximum, average and minimum winnings. The choice of principles and rules must carry out 
negotiators with high qualifications and experience in the fields concerned. 
Table 4. Normalized decision-making matrix (negotiations between the Participant No. 1 and 
Participant No. 2) 
Normalized decision-making matrix 
Alternatives 
Criteria  
Delivery term, months. Price, EUR Possibility of pay delay, percent 
Sum by 
significance 
A1R1 1,000 0,579 1,000 0,886 
A1R2 1,000 0,687 1,000 0,915 
A2R1 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
A2R2 1,000 0,422 1,000 0,844 
     
W11 A1 A2   
R1 0,886 1,000   
R2 0,915 0,844        
Table 5. Normalized decision-making matrix (negotiations between the Participant No. 3 and 
Participant No. 2) 
Normalized decision-making matrix 
Alternatives Criteria  Delivery term, months Price, EUR Possibility of pay delay, percent Sum by significance 
A1R1 1,000 0,715 1,000 0,923 
A1R2 1,000 0,835 1,000 0,956 
A2R1 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
A2R2 1,000 0,766 1,000 0,937 
     
W12 A1 A2   
R1 0,923 1,000   
R2 0,956 0,937   
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 Table 6. Normalized decision-making matrix (negotiations between the Participant No. 4 and 
Participant No. 2) 
Normalized decision-making matrix 
Alternatives 
Criteria 
Delivery term, 
months. 
Price, 
EUR 
Possibility of pay delay, 
percent Sum by significance 
A1R1 1,000 0,463 1,000 0,855 
A1R2 1,000 0,670 1,000 0,911 
A2R1 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
A2R2 1,000 0,367 1,000 0,829 
     
W13 A1 A2   
R1 0,855 1,000   
R2 0,911 0,829   
 
In order to determine which option is the best it is necessary to assess specifics, goals and 
conditions of each task, so there are offered such cases for use: in the examination of multiple 
negotiations and making a lot of decisions it is advisable to apply Bayes (Bayes-Laplace) and 
Hurwitz principles. If negotiations are single, it is better to apply the minimax and Savage-Niehaus 
principles. If under certain conditions is unacceptable even minimal risk it should be based on the 
principle of Wald. If it is possible partial risk, then it is applicable Hodges and Lehman rule to 
calculate the optimal strategies. In considering the negotiation strategies support for wholesale trade 
business negotiations, it can be noted that the strategic principles of the negotiations can vary in 
each question. Results chart shows that optimistic - the highest win provides Savage and Niehaus 
optimization rule, the lowest winnings - Wald rule. Accordingly Hurwitz, Bernoulli-Laplace and 
Laplace-Bayes rules were showed very similar results, and Hodges and Lehman gave slightly 
higher winnings, than the lowest winnings having demonstrated the Wald rule. Figure 4 are given 
sum for all optimization rules winnings results. 
The calculations according to the created model on evaluation of the negotiating powers set that 
the greatest negotiating power has participant No. 3 (the other participants had less negotiating 
powers to negotiate with the negotiator No. 2). While participant No. 3 did not use these study 
results on support of negotiations, but he have reached an agreement with the participant No.2. This 
confirms that it is an effective negotiation support to the development of wholesale trade.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Participants of the negotiations winnings distribution in wholesale trade case, using 
different optimization rules (normalized values) 
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Fig. 4. International business negotiation participants bargaining power assessment sum 
results in wholesale trade case (normalized values) 
6. Conclusions  
It was established that the negotiating strategy model, based on the assessment of bargaining 
power, allowed to take more effective strategic decisions than without using this model. Therefore, 
we can conclude that the results confirm the first and second hypotheses. Prospects of utilization the 
developed model of international business negotiations: negotiation support tool, information 
uncertainty reduction measure, independent engine of the negotiation process, management of large 
quantities information, improving communication conditions. 
In this paper is developed and described model, based on assessments of bargaining power on 
negotiating strategy development and implementation. Is described empirical research methodology 
for preparation and control application of model, based on assessments of bargaining power on 
negotiating strategy development and implementation. It is appropriate to adapt this model and to 
check it in typical international business of other areas of negotiations: services, transport and 
logistics services, attraction of new investment, e-commerce cases. 
From the research results it can be stated that the developed international business negotiation 
strategy planning model can be used for wholesale trade negotiations: both as a standalone tool or 
as a means partly demanding intervention of the negotiator. As well created negotiation strategy 
model can be used to support the negotiations through various databases. Results of the 
investigation can be used to create business negotiation strategies in international business, with 
regard to globalization, internationalization and cooperation processes characterized by 
multiculturalism. The complex decision support model of international business negotiations allows 
adequately to evaluate the bargaining power of participants of negotiations and business 
stakeholders, take into account comprehensive real factors, affecting the outcome of negotiations, 
different countries and cultural cooperation specifics, to optimize international business negotiation 
strategy development and implementation processes, to use effective negotiating powers of 
international business development under modern conditions. Recently for optimization 
management tasks are applied heuristic optimization technique, relying on a variety of solution 
search paradigms, which are often developed by analogy with nature, applying artificial intelligence 
techniques and so on. Heuristic algorithms in negotiations are purposeful due to the nature of the 
negotiations - knowledge of negotiating power is going in the negotiation process itself, thereby 
reducing the uncertainty that hampers negotiating situations by using the rules for calculating the 
optimal strategy (Wald, Werner, Hurwitz et al.). To deal with these tasks are developed a number of 
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 heuristic algorithms which calculates optimum possible to get result over time. Heuristic algorithms 
are used for optimization problems, and they help to achieve high quality. Negotiation is based on 
the gradual knowledge of negotiating power of the other side of negotiations, so with every issue 
you can use other tactics. So, heuristic algorithms can help to manage effectively the negotiation 
process. Selection of principles and rules must be carried out by specialists of high qualifications 
and experience, consultants, negotiators in the fields concerned, in order to determine which option 
is the best, taking into account the specifics of each task, goals and conditions.  
References  
[1] Apynis, A. 2007. Lošimų teorija, Vilnius: Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, ISBN 978-9986-19-
980-9, 2007, 107 p. 
[2] Azar, O. H. 2014. The default heuristic in strategic decision making: When is it optimal to 
choose the default without investing in information search?, Journal of Business Research, 
Volume 67, Issue 8, August 2014, Pages 1744-1748, ISSN 0148-2963, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.02.021. 
[3] Bivainis, J. 2011. Vadyba studentams: mokomoji knyga. Vilniaus Gedimino technikos 
universitetas.Vilnius : Technika, 2011. ISBN: 9789955289333 
[4] Cevikel, A. C.; Ahlatçıoğlu, M. 2010. Solutions for fuzzy matrix games, Computers & 
Mathematics with Applications, Volume 60, Issue 3, August 2010, Pages 399-410, ISSN 0898-
1221, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.camwa.2010.04.020. 
[5] Chang, Y. H.; Wu, T. T. 2011. Dynamic multi-criteria evaluation of co-evolution strategies for 
solving stock trading problems, Applied Mathematics and Computation, Volume 218, Issue 8, 
15 December 2011, Pages 4075-4089, ISSN 0096-3003, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2011.09.032.4 
[6] Ehtamo, H.; Kettunen, E.; Hämäläinen, R. P. 2001. Searching for joint gains in multi-party 
negotiations, European Journal of Operational Research, Volume 130, Issue 1, 1 April 2001, 
Pages 54-69, ISSN 0377-2217, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0377-22170000019-9. 
[7] Eurostat, 2015. Nacionalinės sąskaitos ir BVP. [žiūrėta: 2015 m. rugpjūtis 12 d.,] Interaktyvi 
nuoroda: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php?title=National_accounts_and_GDP/lt&oldid=146923 
[8] Ginevičius, R. 2008. Normalization of quantities of various dimensions, Journal of Business 
Economics and Management, 9:1, 79-86  
[9] Ginevičius, R.; Podvezko, V. 2008a. Daugiakriterinio vertinimo būdų suderinamumas. Verslas: 
Teorija ir praktika 9 (1). 73-80 psl. 
[10] Ginevičius, R.; Podvezko, V. 2008b. Daugiakriterinio vertinimo taikymo galimybės 
kiekybiniam socialinių reiškinių vertinimui. Verslas: Teorija ir praktika 9 (2). 81-87 psl. 
[11] Ginevičius, R.; Podvezko, V.; Raslanas, S. 2008. Evaluating the alternative solutions of wall 
insulation by multicriteria methods, Journal of Civil Engineering and Management, 14:4, 217-
226  
[12] Ginevičius, R.; Suhajda, K.; Petraškevičius, V.; Šimkūnaitė, J. 2014. Lithuanian Experience of 
Quantitative Evaluation of  Socioeconomic Systems Position by Multicriteria Methods, 
Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, Volume 110, 24 January 2014, Pages 952-960, 
ISSN 1877-0428, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.12.941. 
14 Volume 65
 [13] Keršulienė, V. 2008. Užsakovo ir rangovo racionalaus ginčų sprendimo būdo nustatymas 
lošimų teorijos metodais. Daktaro disertacija. Technologijos mokslai, statybos inžinerija 02T. 
128 psl. ISBN 978-9955-28-277-8 
[14] Lietuvos bankas, 2015. Lietuvos ekonomikos raida ir perspektyvos.  
[15] Lietuvos Respublikos ūkio ministerija, 2015. Lietuvos ekonomikos apžvalga.  
[16] Lietuvos statistikos departamentas, 2014. Informacinės technologijos Lietuvoje. Vilnius. 98 psl. 
ISSN 2029-3615  
[17] Lourenzutti, R.; Krohling, R. A. 2014. The Hellinger distance in Multicriteria Decision 
Making: An illustration to the TOPSIS and TODIM methods, Expert Systems with 
Applications, Volume 41, Issue 9, July 2014, Pages 4414-4421, ISSN 0957-4174, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2014.01.015. 
[18] Lova, A.; Maroto, C.; Tormos, P. 2000. A multicriteria heuristic method to improve resource 
allocation in multiproject scheduling, European Journal of Operational Research, Volume 127, 
Issue 2, 1 December 2000, Pages 408-424, ISSN 0377-2217, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0377-
22179900490-7. 
[19] Mandow, L.; Pérez de la Cruz, J.L. 2003. Multicriteria heuristic search, European Journal of 
Operational Research, Volume 150, Issue 2, 16 October 2003, Pages 253-280, ISSN 0377-
2217, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0377-22170200517-9. 
[20] Martín Ramos, J. M.; López García, D.; Gómez-Bravo, F.; Blanco Morón, A. 2010. 
Application of multicriteria decision-making techniques to manoeuvre planning in 
nonholonomic robots, Expert Systems with Applications, Volume 37, Issue 5, May 2010, Pages 
3962-3976, ISSN 0957-4174, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2009.11.019. 
[21] Panda, A.; Das, C. B. 2014. Multi-choice linear programming for matrix game, Applied 
Mathematics and Computation, Volume 237, 15 June 2014, Pages 411-418, ISSN 0096-3003, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2014.03.017. 
[22] Peña, J.; Lehmann, L.; Nöldeke, G. 2014. Gains from switching and evolutionary stability in 
multi-player matrix games, Journal of Theoretical Biology, Volume 346, 7 April 2014, Pages 
23-33, ISSN 0022-5193, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.12.016. 
[23] Stewart, T. J.; French, S.; Rios, J. 2013. Integrating multicriteria decision analysis and scenario 
planning—Review and extension, Omega, Volume 41, Issue 4, August 2013, Pages 679-688, 
ISSN 0305-0483 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2012.09.003. 
[24] Tamošiūnas, L. 2011. Euristinių paieškos algoritmų tyrimas ir taikymas atviro kodo 
geografinėse informacinėse sistemose. Magistro darbas. Kauno technologijos universitetas. 41 
psl. 
[25] Wibowo, S.; Deng, H. 2013. Consensus-based decision support for multicriteria group decision 
making, Computers & Industrial Engineering, Volume 66, Issue 4, December 2013, Pages 625-
633, ISSN 0360-8352, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cie.2013.09.015. 
[26] Xu, Y.; Liu, J.; Zhong, X.; Chen, S. 2012. Lattice-valued matrix game with mixed strategies for 
intelligent decision support, Knowledge-Based Systems, Volume 32, August 2012, Pages 56-
64, ISSN 0950-7051, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.knosys.2011.08.019. 
[27] Zavadskas, E. K.; Peldschus F., Ustinovičius, L., Turskis, Z. 2004. Lošimų teorija statybos 
technologijoje ir vadyboje. Monografija. Vilnius: Technika, 2004. 196 p. 
[28] Žilinskas, K. 2007. Matematinis programavimas I dalis. Tiesinis programavimas. Šiaulių 
universitetas. 304 psl. ISBN 978-9986-38-838-8 
International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences Vol. 65 15
